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Activity and employment rates for immigrant women in many industrialized countries 
display a great variability across national groups. The aim of this paper is to assess whether 
this well-known fact is due to a voluntary decision (i.e. large reservation wages by the 
immigrants) or to an involuntary process  in that . the labour market evaluation of their skills 
is low. This is done by estimating the reservation wages for each individual in the dataset. 
Our results show that low activity and employment rates for certain national groups are not 
associated with high reservation wages. This implies that low participation should not be 
interpreted as a voluntary decision.  
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1.  Introduction
1 
The immigrant labour force makes an essential contribution to the growth and 
development of most of the industrialized countries. At the beginning of the 2000s, 85 
million people residing in the OECD countries had been born abroad, almost three times 
more than in the 1960s. The share of immigrants in total population is quite high for 
economically advanced countries and it ranges from 6 per cent in Italy to almost 25 per cent 
in Canada.  
In many European countries, characterized by a rapidly aging population, the 
economic integration of immigrants is a necessary condition for the achievement of the 
Lisbon targets of full employment and sustainable growth under the European Employment 
Strategy. However, although labour market integration for immigrant men is not generally 
an issue, employment rates for women are often low and characterized by great variability 
according to country of origin.  
There are two possible explanations for this fact. The first is based on “cultural bias”. 
For certain nationalities, gender differences in the division of the family burden may play an 
important role in the labour supply. In other words, traditions may relegate women to the 
more traditional roles and tasks of housekeeping and child-raising. The second is a skill 
mismatch on the labour market. In this case, immigrants are willing to work outside the 
family but their human capital does not satisfy local employers’ requirements.  
This issue is particularly important for policy making. Whether the cultural bias   
explanation is true or not, migration policy should focus on the borders: visas should be 
issued mainly to the nationalities that are more willing to participate in the labour market. In 
the case of skill mismatch, the policy options are more complex and may range from 
selective migration for immigrants whose characteristics are more compatible with the host 
                                                 
1  We wish to thank Prof. G. Blangiardo, ISMU, for kindly providing us with the dataset. We are also 
indebted to Federico Cingano, Sauro Mocetti, Laura Pagani, Alfonso Rosolia, Alberto Zazzaro, two anonymous 
referees, the seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, University of Bari, Bocconi University and AIEL 
(Sassari, 2009) and Jennifer Parkinson for editorial assistance. The views expressed are the authors’ own and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. Usual disclaimers apply. E-mail: 
antonio.accetturo@bancaditalia.it, luigi.infante@bancaditalia.it 
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country’s needs to labour market policies aimed at educating and training workers to help 
them become more suited to local labour market requirements.  
The aim of this paper is to disentangle these two effects by assessing the impact of 
cultural background on women’s decision to participate in the labour market. In particular, 
we investigate whether the observed high variability in the employment and activity rates 
across nationalities is attributable to a cultural or a skill effect by estimating individual 
reservation wages. 
We make use of an extremely rich database compiled by the non-governmental 
organization Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità - ISMU (Initiatives and Studies on 
Multiethnic Society) from surveys of immigrants from the least developed, emerging and 
transition countries now resident in the region of Lombardy in the North-West of Italy. The 
fact that the interviews are collected in the same (relatively small) area of Italy is particularly 
useful for our analysis. The women surveyed face the same labour market conditions; 
moreover, given Italy’s recent tradition in immigration, they are most likely to preserve their 
cultural attitudes with respect to labour market participation. 
There is a considerable body of international evidence on immigrant female 
participation. Many studies (Dustmann and Schmidt, 2000; Constant et al., 2006; Bevelander 
and Groeneveld, 2007; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005; Adsera and Chiswick, 2007) find that 
the probability to work for an immigrant woman is significantly lower even after controlling 
for observable characteristics. This is generally attributed to an unbalanced family burden 
and a cultural bias. Moreover, as Dustmann and Schmidt (2000) point out, the same motives 
also prevent women from accumulating human capital. By using the British Time Use 
Survey, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2007) obtained a similar result for the UK and showed 
that non-white females usually spent more time in “traditional” duties such as religious 
activities and food management than white females.  
The poor labour market outcomes by foreign women is usually attributed to culture or 
religion. For the US, Fernandez and Fogli (2009) find that intergenerational transmission of 
cultural attitudes helps to explain the low contribution to the labour forces by second 
generation immigrant women. Vella (1994) obtains a similar result for educational choices.   
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Heineck (2004) confirms the influence of religion, finding that the frequent attendance of 
places of worship reduces female participation in the labour market in Germany.  
Compared with the previous literature, this paper disentangles the demand (skill) and 
the supply (cultural) components in the decision to participate in the labour market. We 
assess whether low participation rates for certain national groups are due to the fact that they 
attach a high economic value to the time spent at home or because there is a weak demand 
for their skills. This is done by estimating their reservation wages. Our results show that 
culture has a low impact on the decision to work by immigrant women in Lombardy. We 
show that low activity and employment rates for certain national groups (mainly those from 
North African, the Middle East and central Asian) are involuntary since their estimated 
reservation wages are no greater than those of nationalities characterized by higher 
employment levels (for example, Central and Eastern Europeans).
2  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the ISMU dataset and shows 
some of the descriptive statistics; Section 3 explains the most relevant econometric issues; 
Section 4 presents the results; and Section  5 concludes the paper. Appendix 1 shows how 
countries of origin are aggregated in homogenous groups while Appendix 2 presents a 
comparison between our estimated reservation wages and Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. 
2.  Data 
Our main data source is a dataset collected by the ISMU in Lombardy (with the financial 
support of the Lombardy regional government and other private institutions) in the period 
2001-2005. Since 2001, the ISMU has conducted a yearly survey of immigrants living in 
Lombardy. As for migration studies, the dataset has a strong comparative advantage. Its 
most important characteristic is that it is also able to collect information for undocumented 
aliens due to its data-collection process based on the method of aggregation centres 
developed by Blangiardo (1993). 
                                                 
2   The result has an antecedent in Europe in Niesing et al. (1994). By analysing the high unemployment 
rates of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, they conclude many national groups suffer from a “discrimination 
in employment possibilities” due to employer choices.   
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Survey design – Surveys on aggregation centres are specifically designed to collect 
information on a representative sample of immigrants that include also irregular migrants. 
The idea is that even undocumented individuals generally lead a social life by attending, for 
example, places of religious worship or cultural centres. Blangiardo’s method hinges on 
those centres and is based on a three-stage design. In the first, the ISMU interviewers 
allocate the total number of questionnaires (roughly 8,000 each year) across the 11 provinces 
into which Lombardy is partitioned; this is aimed at obtaining significant estimates at 
provincial level by having roughly the same sample variability within each province. In the 
second stage, the ISMU selects a number of representative municipalities (slightly less than 
350, almost 25 per cent of all the towns in Lombardy) within each province according to the 
social and economic characteristics of the area. In the third stage, the ISMU interviewers 
visit all possible aggregation centres for immigrants within each municipality and randomly 
meet the potential interviewees. The aggregation centres usually fall within 11 categories: 
help and counselling centres for immigrants, Italian language courses for foreigners, places 
of worship, healthcare centres, cultural centres, phone/money transfer centres, public offices 
(police stations, town halls, etc.), ethnic restaurants/bars, ethnic shopping centres, other 
(train stations, etc.).
3 Within each aggregation centre, the ISMU interviews usually have the 
support of the leading personalities of the centres (priests, shop owners etc.); this ensures 
that the interviewers are seen as “trusted” people and not public officials. As for the ability 
of the survey to truly detect irregular immigrants, the misreporting of legal status seems tiny. 
In order to provide a comparison between the ISMU estimates and actual data, we compare 
survey results with the most recent alternative dataset based on applications for 
regularization under the Bossi-Fini amnesty law of 2002. In that year, 144,369 individuals 
applied in Lombardy (647,000 in Italy as a whole): this indicates that at least the 31 per cent 
of the total foreign population in Lombardy was irregular in 2002. ISMU estimates for that 
year do not appear far off that figure: in the 2002 wave, self-declared illegal aliens 
represented 27 per cent of the sample.  
Dataset description – This study uses five pooled waves from 2001 to 2005. We 
concentrate on women of working age (i.e. the 15-64 cohorts), which leaves us with roughly 
                                                 
3   See Accetturo and Infante (2010) for a detailed description of the aggregation centres.   
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12 thousand individuals. The ISMU datasets are quite rich and contain some information on 
social and economic characteristics. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Average schooling is quite high (10.7 years)
4 and comparable 
with the figures for the Italian population. Almost 60 per cent of the interviewed women is 
married; they have been residing in Italy for a relatively short period of time (5.7 years). 
Irregular women make up 11.7 per cent of the total. As for religion, more than two thirds of 
the dataset is Catholic or Muslim. Other Christians (mainly Greek-Orthodox) are slightly 
more than one fifth of the sample. Table 1 also provides the distribution of immigrants 
according to the groups of country of origin (see Appendix 1 for the list of countries 
belonging to each group). Almost 30 per cent of the immigrant women come from European 
countries; sizeable groups are also constituted by Central and South Americans and people 
coming from the Near East and North Africa. 
Standard figures on employment status are reported in Table 2,
5 which shows, as is 
usual in many industrialized countries, that there is considerable heterogeneity in labour 
market outcomes according to the country of origin. The employment rate averages 60 per 
cent for the entire sample, while the activity rate is much larger (73.4 per cent). The 
employment rate of the women coming from the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) and Central and South America is roughly two-thirds higher than that for the Near 
East and North African countries (NENAC).
6 The figure for the Central Asia group is even 
smaller. Activity rates display the same great variability across national groups.
7 
                                                 
4   As usual in this literature, we assigned zero years of schooling when the individual does not have any 
formal education, 8 years for a compulsory school leaving certificate, 13 years for high school and 17 for at 
least a university degree. 
5    To be clear, we split the the immigrants in three groups as regards employment status. The first 
comprises the inactive population, i.e. those who stated they were housewives or students. The second group is 
made up of the self-reported unemployed. The third is composed of all employed persons. The “active” group 
includes both  unemployed and employed individuals. 
6   A similar finding is reported by Amuedo and de la Rica (2006) for Spain, according to which African 
women suffer the lowest occupational attainment, with respect to other immigration groups (in particular if 
taken into account the years since migration), while Central and South Americans, along with immigrants 
within EU15, show high level of assimilation. 
7   The characteristics of migration in Lombardy are quite similar to those of the rest of the country. 
According to the Italian LFS (2006-2008 averages), the average schooling level of immigrant women is 10.2 
years. The activity rate is slightly lower (65 per cent) probably due to the different definitions of working status 
between LFS and ISMU. Cross-country differences in the working status for LFS confirm the ISMU data: 
activity rate for NENAC is 20 percentage points lower than the one of CEEC. The only relevant difference   
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3.  Empirical approach  
3.1  How do economists obtain reservation wages? 
The aim of this paper is to report an econometric estimate of the immigrants’ 
reservation wages. In job search theory, the reservation wage is the lowest offered wage that 
an unemployed individual looking for work is prepared to accept (see Blundell and 
MaCurdy, 1999).
8 Although this is a crucial variable in the neoclassical theory of labour 
supply, there is still an open discussion on the best way to estimate it. Two prevailing 
methods are usually available in literature. 
The first is based upon surveys in which unemployed respondents are directly asked 
what their reservation wage is.
9 This information is widely used in many studies: see, among 
others, Addison et al. (2004 and 2010) and, for the Italian case, Sestito and Viviano  (2011). 
The reliability of this information, however, is widely debated. As shown by Burdett and 
Vishwanath (1988) and Hofler and Murphy (1994), self-reported reservation wages are often 
biased and they are usually inconsistent with the actual behaviour of a worker. As Addison 
et al. (2010) point out, this is mainly due to the fact that respondents usually answer by 
indicating the prevailing wage on the labour market, rather than their true reservation value.  
The second method treats reservation wages as unobservables, that must be inferred 
econometrically by the actual behaviour of a worker. This was pioneered by Heckman 
(1974) in his contribution on women’s shadow prices in the labour market and was 
subsequently developed in further studies (see, Kiefer and Neuman, 1979; Fishe, 1982; 
Ferber and Green, 1985; Duncan, 1992; Sharpe and Abdel-Ghany, 1997). The idea is that 
observed wages for employed individuals are those that succeed in exceeding the individual 
                                                                                                                                                       
between ISMU and LFS is in the country of origin composition: in LFS the share of women coming from 
CEEC is 54 percent, more than 20 percentage points greater than the ISMU figure. 
8     In a static framework, with quasi-convex utility functions, the reservation wage is equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. 
9    For example, the Italian Labour Force Survey asks unemployed workers “What is the lowest net 
monthly wage you would be willing to accept?”.   
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reservation values. This implies that, by controlling for the selectivity bias, actual market 
wages contain enough information to infer workers’ reservation wages.
10  
In this paper we adopt the second methodology for two main reasons. The first relies 
upon the above-mentioned reliability problems of self-reported reservation wages – 
problems that can be greatly aggravated for migrants, whose understanding of the crucial 
features of the local labour market is more limited. The second relates to whether there is 
sufficient information in the LFS. In Appendix 2 we provide the results for self-reported 
reservation wages in the Italian LFS. By concentrating on immigrants living in the North 
(where Lombardy is located and where most of the immigrants in Italy live), we end up with 
just under 1,000 individuals, which is one-tenth of our baseline estimates database. 
The methodology we use in this paper is based on the Mohanty’s (2005) extension of 
the Heckman model with frictional unemployment and feedbacks between labour demand 
and supply. As will soon be clearer, from a technical point of view, the only difference 
between this methodology and Heckman’s lies in the first stage, which is bivariate-probit 
rather than probit estimated. This allows us to take into account a double selectivity bias due 
to involuntary unemployment or feedback effects between demand and supply.
11 
3.2  The estimate of reservation wages: an econometric approach 
A woman i decides to participate in the labour market (i.e. to be active) whenever the 
wage offers she expects to receive are greater than her own reservation wage. In formulas, 




i = y1i0, where w
o
i is the expected wage 
offer, w
r
i is her reservation wage and y1i represents the (normalized) individual preference 
for labour market participation. Whenever y1i is greater than zero, individual i participates in 
the labour market, whenever it is negative she prefers to stay at home. It immediately 




i – y1i and can be computed by 
estimating preferences (y1i) and wage offers (w
o
i).  
                                                 
10 An important advance on this topic is the estimation of structural search models by using the panel 
structure of many LFSs. As will be clearer later, this method cannot be used in this paper because the ISMU 
dataset is compiled on the basis  of pooled cross-sections. 
11   Mohanty (2005), in turn, generalizes the procedure to cases with multiple selection bias following the 
approach in Meng and Schmidt (1985). Recently Baffoe-Bonnie (2009) uses a similar framework to study wage 
differentials.   
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Estimates for y1i and w
o
i are obtained in two steps. 
In the first step we consider both the participation decision and the hiring process in 
the labour market. Woman i is employed only if she decides to participate in the labour 
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where y2i  represents the (normalized) employers’ preferences over individual i. 
The aim of the first step is to compute the latent variables y1 and y2 by estimating the 
following two equations: 
y1 = x1 b1 + e1         ( 1 )  
y2 = x2 b2 + e2         ( 2 )  
by a bivariate probit with partial observability. The choice of the bivariate probit is 
particularly useful since it allows us to treat demand and supply components simultaneously. 
As mentioned above, this allows us to take into account the existence of feedbacks between 
the decision to participate and the expected labour market outcome. Operationally, x1 
contains a set of variables aimed at capturing the economic and cultural determinants for the 
labour supply, while x2 includes all the possible personal characteristics which are likely to 
influence the employer’s willingness to hire an individual.  
As for the supply components, x1 includes schooling, potential experience, religion 
dummies and their interaction with marital status, number of children below and above 18 
years of age and a set of time dummies. The number of under age children may indicate a 
greater interest for childcare and housekeeping while the number of children over 18 should 
have a positive effect on the labour supply since offspring could need financial support from 
the family of origin. Religion dummies indicate a cultural attitude toward labour, especially   
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when a woman is married. As will be clear later, religion dummies play a fundamental role 
as identification variables in the empirical strategy.  
On the demand side, x2 contains schooling; years since migration; dummies for 
country of origin; time; and space.
12 Years since migration are expected to enhance the 
probability for a worker to be employed since during these years the worker is likely to 
increase his ability to understand the crucial features of the host country’s labour market and 
local language; country dummies capture the workers’ heterogeneity in terms of the quality 
of the institutions in their area of origin (for example, educational system, sectoral 
specialization) while spatial dummies capture time invariant local characteristics that are 
likely to influence employment levels. 
x1  and x2 share the schooling variable and time dummies, since education is likely to 
have an effect on both the demand and supply components and year dummies take into 
consideration business cycle fluctuations. 
The latent variable of interest (ŷ1) is calculated by taking the predicted values (linear 
prediction) of equation (1). 
 
In the second step, we compute expected wage offers. We estimate the following wage 
equation using a correction for a double selectivity bias (Tunali, 1986): 
i c t s i i
m
i u D D D c c x b w         2 23 1 13 3 3 ln         (3) 
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.   and  represent, respectively, the density and the 
cumulative function of a standard normal distribution, while  (rho) is the correlation of the 
                                                 
12   Spatial dummies include one dummy for each of local labour markets in the partitions of  Lombardy.   
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error terms in the bivariate probit. x3 includes standard variables in migration-augmented 
mincerian equations: schooling, potential experience and years since migration. The 
regression includes spatial dummies ( s D ) to take into account spatial differences in wage 
levels; time dummies ( t D ) to control for business cycle effects; and country of origin 
dummies ( c D ) to control for institutional factors such as sectoral specialization or 
educational quality. 














m w  is the predicted value of equation (3). 
o w ˆ  represents the expected market 
wage conditional on the individual characteristics and controlling for the selectivity bias due 
to participation and hiring decisions.
13 
Reservation wages can now be calculated as ŵ
r = ŵ
o - ŷ1 for all the individuals in the 
sample. 
 
By comparing all the variables in x1, x2 and x3, the crucial role of religion dummies 
and their interaction with marital status as identification variables is now apparent. The idea 
is that religion is a private matter that affects the individual working decisions but should not 
affect the labour market evaluation (wages) and the hiring decision by a non-discriminating 
employer. In other words, the worker’s productivity should be influenced by the country of 
origin’s institutional setting (school quality, sectoral specialization etc.) but not by the 
migrant’s private attitudes toward religion (which does, however, influence her decision to 
work). This implies that by inserting country dummies in equations (2) and (3) we estimate a 
supply effect that is within-country and across religions. This can be done only if we have an 
                                                 
13    Expected wages are also computed for unemployed and inactive individuals. Predicted values are 
computed without the country of origin dummies coefficients. In this way, we net out the effects of wage level 
differentials on the computed reservation wages. However, results do not change when we insert country of 
origin dummies in the predicted values calculations.    
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imperfect overlap between religions and countries of origin, i.e. when there are different 
religious creeds within a country. In order to have a suitable sample for this identification we 
exclude all individuals coming from a country where, according to the ISMU dataset, only 
one creed is professed. The list of a diversification indicator of religions (Herfindhal index: 
HI
14) in each country is provided in Appendix 1; the higher HI the less diverse the country; 
in all the analyses we exclude all countries with a HI equal to one. 
 
3.3  Cross-country differences and robustness 
After computing the reservation wages, we test whether they systematically differ 
across groups of nationalities. We calculate the percentage differences between each group 
and our reference cluster (Central and Eastern European Countries, CEEC). The choice of 
CEEC as a benchmark
15 relies on the fact that, Central and Eastern European women share 
similar institutions with the host country. We focus, in particular, on the differences between 
the CEEC group and two nationalities that display the lowest activity and employment rates: 
NENAC and Central Asia. If the reservation wages for those groups were higher, the 
observed low labour market participation would be interpreted as voluntary: the value 
NENAC and Central Asian women attach to their time spent at home is so high that they are 
not attracted by the local labour market. Conversely, if their reservation wages were 
comparable or lower to that of our reference group, their inactive status would be interpreted 
as involuntary: their reservation values are not particularly high but they remain unemployed 
because the arrival rate of job offers is quite low. 
We further check the robustness of these estimates along four lines.  
                                                 














 where R is the set of religions,  rc P  is the 
number of immigrants of religion r coming from country c and  c P   is the number of people coming from 
country c. When in country c there is only one religion, HI is equal to one. 
15   As in most papers, our first choice would have been native women; but since the ISMU dataset only 
concentrates on immigrants, we chose the CEEC group as the closest to the native one.   
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The first check is based on Italian migration law according to which it is necessary to 
have a job in order to obtain a visa. As an exception to this rule, immigrants can enter Italy 
to join their family and obtain a visa based on family reunification. For those cases, 
migrants’ true shadow values should be revealed since they do not need to work to obtain a 
residence permit. We check this issue by restricting the analysis to those women who 
migrated to Italy with a family reunification visa. This information is available for all years 
except for 2004: migrants entering the country for  with a family reunification visa amount 
to 2,408. 
The previous scheme obviously implies that the immigrants have a good knowledge of 
the Italian migration laws. We can generalize this scheme by focussing on migrants with a 
blood relative already residing in the country. Again, for those individuals their shadow 
values could be higher, since they can rely on the family's financial support while looking 
for work. We check this issue by restricting the analysis to women who entered the country 
when a next of kin was already residing here. This leaves us with 1,753 individuals. 
The third check is based on the analysis of the irregular migrants. Undocumented 
aliens have very weak bargaining power with respect to their employers as they cannot join a 
union and must work off the books. This implies that wage offers are usually quite low (see 
Accetturo and Infante, 2010, on this topic) and, therefore, they may be quite close to the 
reservation wages. Moreover, illegal aliens’ incentives to work are particularly strong since 
their only chance of being  regularized under one of the recurrent amnesties is strictly linked 
to evidence that they are employed on Italian soil. In other words, they are more likely to 
accept the jobs they are offered. In the ISMU dataset, irregular women are surveyed each 
year and they amount to 1,303 individuals. 
The fourth check is based on the relationship between religions and countries. As we 
said before, we already discard all the observations coming from one-religion countries. 
However, in some countries a religion could prevail but not be  the only one (for example, 
Islam in Arab countries or Roman Catholicism in Central and South America); this implies 
that from the employer’s point of view religions and countries of origin are quite 
indistinguishable thus invalidating our identification structure. We cope with this problem by 
restricting our analysis to a group of countries that can be considered truly multi-religious.   
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This is done by discarding all observations coming from countries whose HI based on 
religions exceeds 0.75: this leaves us with 8,305 individuals. 
4.  Results 
4.1  Baseline sample 
The first part of this section is devoted to the results of the baseline sample. This group 
is constituted by all the regular women of working age interviewed in the 2001-2005 waves. 
Table 3 shows the results of both the bivariate probit estimates (columns [1] and [2]) 
and the wage equation (column [3]). As expected, schooling positively affects the 
probability to be active and to be employed in the labour market. Moreover, potential 
experience increases the probability to supply labour and the years spent in Italy increases 
the likelihood to be employed. The number of children below (above) 18 years old 
reasonably raise (decrease) the probability to be active. Estimates also show that the 
correlation among error terms (rho) is quite high.
16  
In the second step, we estimate a classical wage equation for all working individuals 
and we take into account the possible selection bias by plugging the computed 1 and 2 into 
the equation. Results are displayed in column [3]. All variables have the expected sign and 
they are significant. The highly significant coefficients of 1 and  2 imply that selection is at 
work. The use of estimated values of columns [1] and [3] allows us to compute reservation 
wages. 
Before starting with the comparison across national groups it is worth assessing 
whether estimated reservation wages are consistent with the predictions of the standard 
theory of labour supply (Table 4). As Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) point out, individuals 
with a higher inter-temporal elasticity of substitution should have lower reservation wages: 
this is confirmed in our estimates since younger individuals attach a lower economic value to 
                                                 
16   This is due to the fact that the dependent variables in the biprobit are highly correlated since they only 
differ in the values they assume for unemployed individuals. This may generate a collinearity problem between 
1 and  2 in the estimate of the wage equation. A possible way to circumvent this problem is to treat equations 
(1) and (2) in a sequential way by estimating an Heckprob model. The results, not shown here to save space but 
available upon request, are in line with those presented in the text.   
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time spent at home compared with older cohorts. Even education plays an important role in 
setting the individual's reservation value. Consistently with the standard theory, we find that 
more educated individuals usually set higher reservation wages. Finally we check whether 
individuals residing in a city
17 have a lower reservation value because of lower job-search 
costs thanks to better access to the transportation network. This is confirmed by the bottom 
panel, in which we show reservation wages for workers in a city by educational group. 
We subsequently deal with the core estimates of the paper. In Table 5 we analyse the 
reservation wages and their differences across national groups. Columns [1] and [2] show 
the activity and employment rates for the baseline sample (regular aliens),
18 the last column 
reports the percentage difference of the reservation wage of a national group with respect to 
the CEEC. 
Estimates show that while the share of active and working population is substantially 
low for the NENAC and Central Asia group, their reservation wages are statistically smaller 
than those computed for the CEEC group. This suggests that low participation should not be 
attributed to a cultural attitude that raises the economic value of the time spent at home, but, 
rather, to a skill mismatch between local labour market requirements and immigrants’ 
abilities.  
We further split the computed reservation wages across educational levels and years 
since migration. 
Table 6 shows the differentiated effects across four classes of education: no education, 
primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. Baseline results are confirmed as reservation 
wages for NENAC and Central Asian are always statistically lower than the estimate for the 
CEEC. In columns [1] to [4] of table 7 we report the percentage differences in reservation 
wages for subgroups belonging to (respectively) the first to the fourth quartile of the 
distribution of years since migration. Even in this case the results remain undisputed.  
                                                 
17    We define “city” the local labour market of the three most important towns of Lombardy: Milan, 
Brescia and Bergamo. 
18   Reported figures are quite similar to those in Table 2 since the regular aliens constitute almost 90 per 
cent of the ISMU sample.   
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4.2  Robustness 
So far we have obtained the interesting result that the low employment/activity rates 
registered for certain groups are not associated with higher reservation wages.  
In this section we present four robustness checks by restricting the analysis to: (i) a 
women who benefited from a visa based on family reunification, (ii) immigrants with a 
blood relative at the time of migration to the host country, (iii) undocumented immigrants, 
and (iv) immigrants coming from truly multi-religious countries.  
Results for the first check are shown in Table 8. Columns [1] and [2] report, 
respectively, the shares of active and working population among those who entered with a 
family reunification visa: consistently with the standard theory of labour supply, activity and 
employment rates are quite small now, thus reflecting their possibility to sustain larger spells 
of unemployment;
19 however, there are still differences across national groups. In column 
[3] we report the estimated reservation wage. Baseline results are still confirmed: NENAC 
and Central Asia are among the lowest participant group in the labour market, while the 
reservation wage  in this subsample is also the lowest for the Central Asian women, and 
statistically equivalent to the benchmark group for the NENAC women. A very similar 
picture is depicted in Table 9, which shows the estimates for immigrants with a blood 
relative already residing in Italy.  
Estimates for the irregulars are reported in Table 10. Columns [1] and [2] (activity and 
employment rates) show that incentives to work are particularly strong for the irregulars. 
Activity rate averages around 90 per cent, while the employment rate is much lower (64 per 
cent). Cross-national differences are still in place, especially in the employment rates, 
although they narrow with respect to the baseline sample. However, our baseline result on 
reservation wages remains undisputed: the difference in reservation wages is negative and 
statistically significant for the NENAC group, while negative but not significant for Central 
Asian migrants.  
Finally, Table 11 tackles the issue of the multi-religious countries. As explained above, 
even in nations with an HI based on religions smaller than one, we can observe the 
                                                 
19   This result is confirmed by Constant and Zimmermann (2005).   
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prevalence of one religion that can invalidate our identification strategy. To address this 
concern, we only consider countries with an HI lower than 0.75. Results remain quite similar 
to the baseline ones, thus confirming the correctness of the identification strategy. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
As in many advanced countries, activity and employment rates for immigrant women 
in Italy display great variability across nationals groups. Some nationalities (NENAC, 
Central Asia), in particular, are characterized by extremely low participation in the labour 
market. This fact can be due to either a supply “cultural” or a demand “skill” effect. The aim 
of this paper is to disentangle these two components by estimating the economic value of the 
time spent at home (reservation wages). 
From a technical point of view, we use religion as an identification variable for the 
effects of culture on labour supply in multi-religious countries. Our results show that low 
activity and employment rates for NENAC and Central Asia are not associated with higher 
reservation wages; this implies that low migrant participation is attributable to a weak 
demand for their skills rather than to a high value ascribed to time spent at home. This result 
is quite robust to a number of sample selections and specification tests. In particular, the 
reservation wage differentials do not change according to the mode of entry into the host 
country (visa based on family reunification or the presence of blood relatives) or to legal 
status within the host country.  
This result can hardly be overstated and it may have some important policy 
implications. As low participation is mainly involuntary, policymakers have a set of policies 
that can be used to raise participation and employment rates. The first option is related to 
selective migration. As far as the policymakers are concerned, with a quantitative target (e.g. 
Lisbon criteria), admissions could be aimed at those nationalities whose capabilities to 
integrate are particularly high. The policy, in this case, could also be designed to require 
different educational levels for different countries of origin. Alternatively, for the 
nationalities whose skills are particularly mismatched, the policymaker can think of stricter 
educational requirements. The second set of options relates to policies for labour market 
inclusions. The idea is to create a set of training programmes with the aim of helping 
immigrants to become more suited to local labour market requirements.    
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Table 1 










School 11,852  10.746  4.541 
Potential Experience  11,852  16.764  9.295 
Years in Italy  11,989  5.734  4.610 
Net monthly wage  9,988  606.874  1214.336 
Children below 18yrs  12,015  0.696  0.990 
Children above 18yrs  12,015  0.527  1.566 
Married 12,015  0.569  0.495 
Family  network  4,851 0.358 0.479 
Family  reunification  visa  9,914 0.226 0.441 
Irregular 12,015  0.117  0.321 
    
  No. Obs.  Percentages 
Religions:    
Catholic 12,015  38.33 
Muslim 12,015  30.89 
Other Christians  12,015  18.46 
Buddhists 12,015  3.21 
Hindu 12,015  1.35 
Other 12,015  2.24 
No creed  12,015  5.52 
Groups of countries of origin:     
Central and Eastern European 
Countries 
12,015 28.56 
Central or Southern America  12,015  19.55 
Near East and North Africa  12,015  18.29 
Sub-Saharan Africa  12,015  15.59 
East Asia  12,015  12.44 
Central Asia  12,015  5.57 






   




ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT RATES ACROSS NATIONAL GROUPS 
  Activity rate  Employment rate 
 Central and Eastern European 
Countries 
82.0 70.1 
Central or Southern America  86.9  73.9 
Near East and North Africa  49.7 41.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  78.3  66.0 
East Asia  77.1 71.1 
Central Asia  38.2 29.8 
Total 73.4  62.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
Activity and employment rates are computed on self-declared working status. Averages weighted according to the sample design.  
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Table 3 
BASELINE SAMPLE 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
  Biprobit estimates  Wage equation 





Net monthly wage 
0.039*** 0.024*** 0.007***  School 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
0.043*** - 0.009***  Potential experience 
(0.005)  (0.002) 
-0.069*** - -0.021***  (Potential experience)2 (x100) 
(0.011)  (0.000) 
- 0.101***  0.016***  Years in Italy 
 (0.009)  (0.005) 
- -0.415***  -0.047*  (Years in Italy)2(x100) 
 (0.051)  (0.025) 
0.045** -  -0.058***  Children below 18yrs 
(0.021)  (0.007) 
-0.088*** - -0.022***  Children above 18yrs 
(0.016)  (0.006) 
-0.554*** -  -0.046**  Marital status 
(0.066)  (0.014) 
Spatial dummies  NO  Local labour system  Local labour system 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES 
Religion dummies and their 
interaction with the marital status  YES NO  NO 
Country of origin dummies  NO  YES  YES 
- -  -0.171**  Lambda1 
   (0.068) 
- -  -0.163**  Lambda2 
   (0.074) 
0.231** -0.492***  7.100***  Intercept 
(0.103) (0.119) (0.089) 
Rho 0.916  - 
No. Obs.  10,459  5,937 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * between 
5 per cent and 10 per cent. All regressions are weighted according to the sample design.   
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Table 4 
ESTIMATED RESERVATION WAGES: STANDARD PROPERTIES 
(BASELINE SAMPLE) 
All individuals  780.86 
Age:   





Years of schooling:   
< 8  682.24 
8-12   780.25 
13-16 786.96 
17  820.88 
Years of schooling in a city:   
< 8  677.69 
8-12   765.09 
13-16 778.79 
17  816.54 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
Means are weighted according to the sample design. 
A woman is considered to be living in a city if she resides in one of the towns belonging to the local labour 
markets of Milan, Brescia and Bergamo.   
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Table 5 
RESERVATION WAGE DIFFERENCES ACROSS NATIONALITIES  
(BASELINE SAMPLE) 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 




Reservation wages (1) 
    Percentage difference with respect to the 
 CEEC group: 
  Central and Eastern European 
Countries  79.8 69.9   
0.029***  Central or Southern America  85.3 73.4  (0.006) 
-0.096***  Near East and North Africa  47.0 40.5  (0.007) 
-0.003  Sub-Saharan Africa  76.4 66.6  (0.007) 
0.045***  East Asia  76.9 71.2  (0.009) 
-0.143***  Central Asia  35.1 27.5  (0.011) 
No. Obs.  10,459 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * 
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
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Table 6 














Percentage difference with respect to the 
CEEC group: 
    
0.054 0.042***  0.022** -0.002  Central or Southern America 
(0.038) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) 
-0.021 -0.026*  -0.082***  -0.074***  Near East and North Africa 
(0.027) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) 
0.052* 0.071***  0.040***  -0.075***  Sub-Saharan Africa 
(0.029) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) 
-0.040 -0.001  0.026** 0.011  East Asia 
(0.042) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) 
-0.039  -0.102*** -0.116*** -0.137***  Central Asia 
(0.033) (0.018) (0.017) (0.033) 
No.  Obs.  964  3702 4273 1520 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent 
and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
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Table 7 
RESERVATION WAGE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS YEARS SINCE MIGRATION 
(BASELINE SAMPLE) 
 [1] 
Less than 3 
years 
[2] 
3 to 5 
years 
[3] 
5 to 8 
years 
[4] 
More than 8 
years 
Percentage difference with respect to the 
CEEC group: 
    
0.017 0.008 0.015  0.030**  Central or Southern America 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
-0.063*** -0.064*** -0.120*** -0.064***  Near East and North Africa 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) 
0.030 -0.040***  -0.045***  0.061***  Sub-Saharan Africa 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
-0.029 0.010 -0.022 0.008  East Asia 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
-0.071*** -0.171*** -0.159*** -0.104***  Central Asia 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) 
No.  Obs.  1901 2601 2855 3102 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent 
and 5 per cent, * between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
 
   
 -  30  - 
Table 8 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: FAMILY REUNIFICATION VISA 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 




Reservation wages (1) 
    Percentage difference with respect to the 
 CEEC group: 
  Central and Eastern European 
Countries  54.4 42.8   
0.067***  Central or Southern America  68.1 55.3  (0.023) 
0.015  Near East and North Africa  27.0 22.6  (0.016) 
0.025  Sub-Saharan Africa  52.8 47.5  (0.020) 
-0.025  East Asia  53.0 50.5  (0.021) 
-0.063***  Central Asia  28.6 16.5  (0.022) 
No. Obs.  2,408 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * 
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
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Table 9 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: FAMILY TIES 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 




Reservation wages (1) 
    Percentage difference with respect to the 
 CEEC group: 
  Central and Eastern European 
Countries  60.8 45.4   
-0.0126  Central or Southern America  72.1 65.7  (0.0128) 
-0.0234**  Near East and North Africa  24.7 19.9  (0.00986) 
0.0248**  Sub-Saharan Africa  51.7 44.3  (0.0110) 
0.0108  East Asia  66.6 60.1  (0.0133) 
-0.0438***  Central Asia  24.5 16.0  (0.0130) 
No. Obs.  1,753 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * 
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
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Table 10 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: IRREGULAR ALIENS 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 




Reservation wages (1) 
    Percentage difference with respect to the 
 CEEC group: 
  Central and Eastern European 
Countries  91.6 61.4   
0.087***  Central or Southern America  94.8 74.6  (0.031) 
-0.251***  Near East and North Africa  86.9 56.4  (0.045) 
-0.078**  Sub-Saharan Africa  92.0 59.6  (0.037) 
0.028  East Asia  85.5 72.6  (0.052) 
-0.153  Central Asia  88.8 57.7  (0.103) 
No. Obs.  1,303 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * 
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
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Table 11 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK: MULTIRELIGIOUS COUNTRIES 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 




Reservation wages (1) 
    Percentage difference with respect to the 
 CEEC group: 
  Central and Eastern European 
Countries  79.8 69.9   
0.0296  Central or Southern America  84.0 71.0  (0.0301) 
-0.482***  Near East and North Africa  31.0 27.7  (0.0470) 
0.0893***  Sub-Saharan Africa  76.6 66.8  (0.0286) 
-0.0319  East Asia  76.9 71.2  (0.0303) 
-0.495***  Central Asia  35.1 27.5  (0.0401) 
No. Obs.  8,305 
Source: Authors’ calculations on ISMU dataset. 
(1) Percentage differences in computed reservation wages. Stars show significance levels, *** up to 1 per cent, ** between 1 per cent and 5 per cent, * 
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. Mean differences are weighted according to the sample design. 
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 Appendix 1. National groups and countries of origin 
(Herfindhal index of religions in parenthesis) 
Central and Eastern European Countries: Bulgaria (0.42), Czech Rep. (0.46), 
Estonia (0.33), Latvia (0.38), Lithuania (0.36), Poland (0.66), Romania (0.43), Slovakia 
(0.62), Slovenia (0.34), Hungary (0.56), Albania (0.30), Belarus (0.70), Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(0.34), Croatia (0.33), Serbia-Montenegro (0.34), Macedonia (0.31), Moldova (0.68),  Russia 
(0.46), Turkey (0.68), Ukraine (0.59). 
Central and Southern America: Argentina (0.54), Bahamas (0.55), Barbados (1), 
Belize (1), Bolivia (0.88), Brazil (0.67), Chile (1), Colombia (0.77), Costa Rica (0.55), Cuba 
(0.40), Dominica (0.78), Dominican Rep. (0.72), Ecuador (0.77), El Salvador (0.58), 
Jamaica (0.37), Guatemala (1), Haiti (1), Honduras (0.72), Mexico (0.94), Nicaragua (1), 
Panama (0.50), Paraguay (0.83), Peru (0.70), Santa Lucia (1), Trinidad and Tobago (1), 
Uruguay (0.73), Venezuela (0.58). 
Near East and North Africa: Algeria (0.92), Egypt (0.72), Libya (0.76), Morocco 
(0.81), Tunisia (0.98), Saudi Arabia (1), UAE (1), Jordan (0.53), Bahrain (1), Iran (0.76), 
Iraq (0.50), Kuwait (1), Lebanon (0.61), Palestine (0.34), Syria (0.66), Yemen (0.25). 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola (0.41), Benin (0.30), Botswana (1), Burkina Faso (0.44), 
Burundi (0.45), Cameroon (0.46), Capo Verde (0.73), Central African Rep. (1), Chad, 
Comores, Congo (0.37), Congo (Dem. Rep.) (0.57), Côte d’Ivoire (0.47), Eritrea (0.31), 
Ethiopia (0.36), Gabon (0.33), Gambia (0.58), Ghana (0.38), Djibouti (1), Guinea (0.51), 
Guinea Bissau (0.52), Equatorial Guinea (0.26), Kenya (0.26), Lesotho (0.26), Liberia 
(0.25), Madagascar (0.52), Malawi (1), Mali (0.88), Mauritania (0.32), Mauritius (0.29), 
Mozambique (0.59), Namibia (1), Niger (0.36), Nigeria (0.38), Rwanda (0.43), Sao Tome e 
Principe (1), Seychelles (0.28), Senegal (0.60), Sierra Leone (0.44), Somalia (0.43), South 
Africa (1), Sudan (1), Tanzania (0.55), Togo (0.38), Uganda (0.72), Zambia (0.59), 
Zimbabwe (0.50). 
East Asia: Cambodia (0.30), China (0.30), North Korea (0.26), South Korea (0.37), 
Philippines (0.69), Indonesia (0.27), Laos (0.33), Malaysia (0.62), Myanmar (0.50), 
Singapore (1), Sri Lanka (0.31), Taiwan (1), Thailand (0.53), Vietnam (1). 
Central Asia: Afghanistan (0.5), Armenia (1), Azerbaijan (0.55), Bangladesh (0.68), 
Georgia (1), India (0.25), Kazakhstan (0.36), Kyrgyzstan (1), Nepal (1), Pakistan (0.74), 
Uzbekistan (0.55).   
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Appendix 2. A comparison with the self-reported reservation wages in the Italian 
Labour Force Survey. 
In this Appendix, we compare our estimates for reservation wages on ISMU data with 
those provided in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). We use on the 2006-08 waves of LFS, as 
previous ones do not provide information on the citizenship of foreign workers. Moreover, in 
order to provide a comparable result we concentrate on unemployed females in the 15-64 
age bracket residing in the North of the country,
20 where Lombardy is located. We provide 
here the answer to the question “What is the lowest net monthly wage you would be willing 
to accept?” Results (Table A1) show that the magnitude for reservation wages is quite 
similar across national groups. Moreover, cross-national differences in LFS basically mirror 
those in our estimates.  
                                                 
20   The extension to other regions provides very similar results since immigrants in Italy mostly settle in 
the North.   
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Table A1 
COMPARISON BETWEEN LFS AND OUR ESTIMATES 
 [1]  [2] 
  LFS Our  estimates 
Central and Eastern European Countries  832.93  780.03 
Central or Southern America  816.22  797.43 
Near East and North Africa  728.55  754.16 
Sub-Saharan Africa  731.42  811.01 
East Asia  741.45  781.28 
Central Asia  788.53  715.12 
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